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"We're on a Road to Nowhere"-Reasons for the
Continuing Failure to Regulate Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
YOAV OESTREICHER*

This article attempts to review, analyze, and point the fundamental mistakes that have been
made throughout history with respect to the creation of an international convention that
would regulate the recognition and enforcement offoreign judgments, following the colossal
failure at The Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw to solve this problem. It does
so by concentrating on intellectual property law as a model. A salient observation of this
article is that most regional conventions that were adopted and implemented have become
relative successes while all internationalinstruments that have been proposed have not been
adopted by the internationalcommunity, despite the fact that they were drafted based on
similar models. The major contribution of this article is pinpointing why the international
community rejected the international instruments, the conclusion being that the drafters of
past internationalinstruments used the "double" or "mixed" convention models, thus attempting to address notjust the issue of recognition and enforcement ofjudgments (as a "simple" convention would do) but also the issue ofjurisdiction on which the potential Member
Countriesfind it difficult to agree. Previous attempts were too ambitious in the sense that
they neglected to comprehend the fundamental cultural, historical, and economic differences
among societies, which form a barrier to agreementon thejurisdiction issue since many countries view adoption of pre-determinedjurisdiction rules as potential interference with their
sovereignty.

I.

Introduction
How then should our contemporary world handle problems in which the persons
concerned and the interests and policies at stake are connected with more than one

* Dr. Yoav Oestreicher is an adjunct professor of law at Bar-Ilan and Haifa Universities, and a partner at
Gilat, Bareket & Co. in Israel; SJ.D., Duke University School of Law, 2004; LL.M., Duke University School
of Law, 2001; LL.M., Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law, 1999; LL.B., Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law,
1997; member of the New York, North Carolina, and Israel Bars. I would like to thank Professor Jerome H.
Reichman, Professor James Boyle, and Professor Paul D. Carrington of Duke University for their extremely
helpful comments and suggestions on my doctorate dissertation, on which this article is partly based. I an, of
course, solely responsible for the views expressed in this article and any errors that still remain. "Road to No
Nowhere" is a song by the Talking Heads.
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community? What happens when a problem arises between or among individuals or
groups in some measure owing their allegiance to, and living their lives in, different
communities?'
More than forty years after these words were written and nearly three years after the
Hague Convention Judgments project was concluded with a proposal for a new international convention that only one country has chosen to ratify, I revisit some of the same
questions raised by Von Mehren and Trautman. This article is an attempt to understand
why in 2008 we still do not have an international instrument that regulates the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. Any future attempt to devise a more effective
convention depends on the ability to first identify the reasons for the failure of past attempts to achieve this goal.
When this research project started in December 2000, there seemed to be a sense of
euphoria in the air as to the prospects of reaching an agreement with respect to the creation of a new international convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The negotiations were at their most intense, and a new draft was offered as a basis for
discussion. Today, seven years later, this promising and ambitious project has shrunk substantially to a very modest and narrow proposal for a convention regulating recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments based on exclusive choice of court agreements.
While not designed as such, it has turned into a real-time, live, microcosmic experiment
regarding the dynamics involved in solving the problems associated with recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This experiment resulted in the resurfacing of the

very same problems that had occupied the private international law world for hundreds of
years, and today, the same old questions that led to the initiation of the Hague judgments
project almost two decades ago once again reemerge. This failed attempt by the international community simply reiterated and emphasized that these problems never went away.
This was not the first attempt to address this issue from an international perspective and
most likely will not be the last.
This article reviews, analyzes, and points out the fundamental mistakes that were made
in the past with respect to the creation of an international convention regulating this issue.
The focus is on the field of intellectual property law as a model because it has undergone a
very substantial global harmonization process throughout the last century. In fact, one of
the most disputed issues during the Hague negotiations was the recognition and enforce2
ment of foreign intellectual property judgments.
1. ARTnIUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULT1STAIE PROBLIMS 3
(1965).
2. For many years, intellectual property rights have been considered to be territorial in nature. Cornish
mentions four different characteristics of the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. These include:
"(1) the effects of the intellectual property right in each country are determined by the law of that country; (2)
the intellectual property right only affects activities in the territory for which it is granted; (3) the right may
be asserted only by nationals of the country for which it is granted, and others given similar status by law; and
(4) the right may be asserted or challenged only in the courts of the country for which it is granted." CHRISTOPHER WADLOw, ENFORCEMENTF OF INTELLFCTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN AND LN-TERNATIONAL

LAW 9 (1998).
There is no such thing as uniform intellectual property law. For a discussion of the term territoriality, see
generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: TerritorialityandAuthors' Rights in a Networked
World, 15 SANTA CLARA Coi. & HIGH TECH. LJ. 347 (1999).
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It is concluded that not enough attention was paid during the negotiation stages of past
attempts to the model being used by the drafters of these instruments. For example, it was
taken for granted during the Hague negotiations that not a simple 3 but rather a double 4 or
mixed 5 convention is the most suitable model to be used. By comparing the relative success of regional instruments regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments with the colossal failure to create an international convention, we conclude that
choosing the wrong model is the main reason that the conventions failed (i.e., drafted as a
double or mixed convention rather than as a simple convention). The drafters of past
international instruments attempted to address not just the issue of recognition and enforcement of judgments (as a simple convention would do) but also the issue of jurisdiction, which the potential Member Countries find it difficult to agree. Previous attempts
were too ambitious in the sense that they neglected to comprehend the fundamental cultural, historical, and economic differences among societies, which form a barrier to agreement on the jurisdiction issue since many countries view adoption of pre-determined
jurisdiction rules as potential interference with their sovereignty. They made a fundamental mistake by drawing from the relative success of regional conventions, such as the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, to the more complicated international sphere, and, by
doing so, ignored the absence of agreement and common ground.
Arguably, it is easier to agree on issues relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments than it is to agree on jurisdiction issues. Thus, adding the jurisdiction
ingredient to the already complicated mix of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may be a recipe for disaster.

3. A simple convention deals only with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and is
therefore not concerned with matters of direct jurisdiction. In other words, it does not respond to the question as to when courts have jurisdiction in proceedings instituted for the first time. If a simple convention
contains rules on jurisdiction, they are only rules on indirect jurisdiction. These are rules which, only a
posteriori,at the stage of the recognition and enforcement of the judgment, serve to verify the jurisdiction of
the court of origin in order to ascertain whether its decision may or may not be recognised or enforced in the
State addressed.
Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of
June 1997 on InternationalJurisdictionand Effects of ForeignJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 11
n.1, Prel. Doc. 8 (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm.pd8.pdf. See also INT'L
LAW

Dwv., DEP'T OFJu5s1-CE, HONG KONG, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE DRAFT HAGUE CONvEN-iION

ON IN'FERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENr OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL OR

COMMERCIAL MATI'ERS, International Law Division, Department of Justice Hong Kong 4 (1999), available

at http://www.infodoj.gov.hk/justice/new/departeng/archive/doc/4499.doc.
4. "A double convention deals with both the question of direct jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It thus responds to the question as to which court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings and to that as to the effect of the judgment thus delivered." Kessedjian, supra note 3, at 1112 n.1.
5. A mixed convention "specifies the authorised grounds of jurisdiction, the prohibited ones and in which
all the other grounds, i.e., those falling neither within the category of authorized grounds nor within that of
the prohibited grounds, are left as a matter for national law to decide freely." Id. The most important
element in the mixed convention model is that the rendering court may assert bases of jurisdiction other than
the mandatory ones provided for in the convention, which leaves it a greater amount of discretion. In other
words, "[wlith a mixed convention... States must always make the authorised grounds of jurisdiction available to the litigants, but they may retain other grounds of jurisdiction." Id.
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II. The Rise and Fall of the International Convention Idea: Overview and
Analysis
There is no doubt that all past attempts to regulate the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments from an international perspective have failed. A question remains as to
why they have failed. Arguably, if we can identify the reasons for the continuing failure to
solve this problem, we can use the outcome of that analysis in the future to circumvent
those problems and difficulties that frustrated drafters in the past.
A. THtE

RELATIVE SUCCESS OF PAST REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS

Due mainly to the industrial revolution and cross-border trade, recognition and enforcement of judgments has become an important issue in international law. 6 While efforts to create a single international instrument that regulates the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments-which were broached mainly in the second half of the
twentieth century-failed, several bilateral and regional conventions addressing this issue
did achieve relative success.
1. The Brussels Convention
The Treaty Establishing the European Community signed in Rome on March 25, 1957
(the "Treaty of Rome), included a requirement in Article 220 that Member States of the
European Community engage in further negotiations "with a view to ensuring for the
benefit of their nationals.., the simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition and execution of judicial decisions and of arbitral awards." 7 The purpose of
the arrangement was to enable the players in the European Community to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist as a result of such economic cooperation by providing
them with reliable legal protection.8 It intended to encourage "free movement of judgments within the European Community, in the same way that there is to be free movement of labour, services, goods, etc." 9 Until its ratification, enforcement and recognition
of foreign judgments were usually based on conventional rules, which allowed the enforcing court to investigate the assertion of jurisdiction by the rendering court. The system
allowed the enforcing court to verify that the rendering court was entitled to assert jurisdiction according to the enforcing court's own rules of jurisdiction and address other
questions, such as whether the judgment was obtained by fraud, whether there was a fair
trial, and whether the defendant received due notice of the proceedings.is The fact that
the rendering court had to make sure that it could hear the case not only under its rules of
jurisdiction but also under any potential enforcing courts' rules of jurisdiction in order for
the latter to agree to enforce or recognize such a judgment created a significant barrier.
6. SeeJFAN-GABRIEL CASTFL, PRIVATE INTFERNATIONAL LAW 257 (1960) (discussing the development of
trade between Canada and the United States since the beginning of the 20th century).
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 220, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 87
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
8. Olivia Struyven, ErorbitantJirisdictionin the Brussels Convention, available at http://www.law.kuleuven.
ac.be/jura/3 5n4/struyven.htm.
9. WILLIAM D. PARK & STEPHEN J.H. CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 3 (1990).
10. Id. at 4.
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In 1960, the Member States set up a committee of experts to implement the requirements of the Treaty of Rome with respect to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The committee's work product came to be known as the European Community's Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of September 27, 1968 (the "Brussels Convention")," which came
12
into force on February 1, 1973, upon ratification by six Member States.
The Brussels Convention created an organized system for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 13 including intellectual property
rights, in certain parts of the European continent. It was drafted as a "double convention," regulating "the jurisdiction which the courts of Contracting States are permitted to
14
exercise ... as well as the conditions upon which such judgments are to be recogni[z]ed."'
The greatest innovation in the structure of the Brussels Convention was its provision of a
relatively detailed set of jurisdictional rules that govern when a court in a Member State
may assert jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in another Member State and in what
situations it should decline to do so. The rendering court in any of the Member States has
to verify that it can assert jurisdiction according to the rules set forth in the convention,
rather than according to its own internal rules, before rendering a judgment. Pursuant to
Article 28 of the Brussels Convention, if the judgment is later introduced to a different
court in another Member State for the purpose of recognition or enforcement, the court
addressed shall only examine whether the rendering court rightfully asserted jurisdiction,
but "shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of the State in which the
judgment was given based its jurisdiction."' 5
Under the provisions of the Brussels Convention, a person who is domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only under the
provisions and conditions set forth in the Brussels Convention, and no other basis of jurisdiction can be asserted against him. If the defendant is not domiciled in one of the Brussels Convention's contracting countries, the national local rules of jurisdiction can apply,
and the provisions of the Brussels Convention do not bind the courts. 16 The courts of the
Contracting States are forbidden from applying rules of "exorbitant jurisdiction,"'1 7 which
until that point was enough to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
11. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 J.O. (L 299) 32 (as amended by the Convention on Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom, reprinted in 1978 OJ. (L 304) 77) [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (subsequent citations will be to the English language version of the full text at 1978 OJ. (L 304) 77).
12. For a general discussion of conflict of laws in Europe, see generally DOMINK LASOK & PETER STONE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COsMuNTry (1987) and MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS
IN WESTFRN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH TIE JUNGLF (1995).
13. See Brussels Convention, supra note 11, art. 1. The Brussels Convention does not apply to status or
legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession, bankruptcy proceedings, social security, and arbitration.
14. See Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, PreliminaryDraft Convention
on Jurisdiction and ForeignJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prel. Doc. 11 (Aug. 2000), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgmpd 11.pdf.
15. There are only a few exceptions to this rule under the Brussels Convention.
16. See Brussels Convention, supra note 11, art. 4, at 79.
17. L]urisdiction is exorbitant when the court seized does not possess a sufficient connection with the
parties to the case, the circumstances of the case, the cause or subject of the action, or fails to take account of
the principle of the proper administration of justice. An exorbitant form of jurisdiction is one which is solely
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When analyzing a specific set of facts under the provisions of the Brussels Convention,
the basic question is whether the rendering court can assert jurisdiction under the strict
rules set forth therein. The basic rule of jurisdiction is that a person domiciled in a Contracting State must always be sued in the courts of that state.' s This basic rule is supplemented by specific grounds of jurisdiction, such as those for contracts 19 or torts. 2° In
addition, the jurisdiction may be limited in certain situations by exclusive rules of jurisdic2
tion, such as those for land. '
The meaning of the term "judgment" under the provisions of the Brussels Convention
is any judgment of a court or tribunal, including costs awarded.2 2 This term includes
interim and provisional orders, even in cases when the court has no jurisdiction over the
main proceedings. There are several exceptions to this general rule, such as interlocutory
2
orders rendered ex parte and intended to be enforced without notice to the defendant. 3
Another exception is interlocutory orders that do not regulate legal relations but rather
24
regulate the further conduct of proceedings.
No special proceedings are needed for the recognition of a judgment rendered in another Contracting State-it is done automatically. 25 A court is not permitted to refuse the
recognition of a judgment rendered by a court in a different country simply because it
thinks that the judgment is wrong.2 6 Furthermore, there are only a few exceptionsincluding cases involving insurance, consumer, and exclusive jurisdiction-to a court's
27
ability to assert jurisdiction based on the general domicile rule.
Recognition should be refused in those cases in which the defendant neglected to appear in the rendering court and set forth her defense due to insufficient service of process. 28 This is a relatively unique arrangement because it allows the enforcing court to
substitute its own judgment for that of the rendering court with respect to the question of
29
whether the defendant could indeed properly and timely assert her defense.
30
The Brussels Convention provides for a public policy exception to the general rule.
This exception is usually invoked in unique situations, such as when the judgment had
31
been obtained by fraud and cannot be set aside by appealing to the rendering court.
intended to promote political interests, without taking into consideration the interests of the parties to the
dispute. Struyven, supra
note 8, at 1.
18. Brussels Convention, supra
note 11, art. 2, at 78 (stating that "persons domiciled in a Contracting State
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State").
19. Id. art. 5(1), at 79 (providing that "in matters relating to a contract... lone can be sued] in the courts
for the place of performance of the obligation in question").
20. Id. art. 5(3), at 79 (providing that "in matters relating to tort... [one may be sued] in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred").
21. See, e.g., id. art. 16(1), at 82.
22. For the purposes of this Convention, 'judgment' means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a
Contracting State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court. Id. art. 25, at 83-84.
23. See PARK & CROMIE, supra
note 9, at 461 n.4.
24. See id.
25. Brussels Convention, supranote 11, art. 26, at 84.
26. See id. art. 29, at 84.
27. See id. art. 7-12A, 13-16, at 80-82.
28. See id. art. 27(2), at 84.
29. See id. For further discussion of this exception, see PARK & CROMIE, supra note 9, at 463.
30. Brussels Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(1).
3 1. See PARK & CROMIE, supra note 9, at 462.
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Another exception is directed at incompatible judgments, which occur when the court
addressed is asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment that is irreconcilable with a
judgment previously rendered by that court 32 or with a judgment rendered by a court in a
non-Contracting State that involved the same parties and cause of action and fulfilled the
necessary conditions to be recognized by the court addressed. 33 With respect to appeals,
the court addressed may stay recognition or enforcement if an appeal process has been
initiated in the rendering state. 34 This exception applies only to ordinary appeals, which
are those that are part of the ordinary course of action in the rendering state.
Procedurally, for a foreign judgment to be enforced under the rules of the Brussels
Convention, the winning party must turn to the enforcing court and ask for an order of
enforcement. 35 Refusal to enforce such a judgment can only take place under the exceptions to the general recognition and enforcement rule set forth above.
The Brussels Convention was the first major regional instrument to also address the
issue of recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to intellectual property rights.
One has to remember that this convention was drafted prior to the introduction of the
internet and the digital revolution. It was drafted in 1968, a time when the concept of
intellectual property rights was more closely related to traditional patents, copyrights, and
trademarks that rarely had any impact or value outside the geographic borders of the
country that granted them than it was to the transmission of electronic, non-fixed files
transferred by a click of a button to every computer on the face of the earth. At the time
of its drafting, international infringement of intellectual property rights was rare due to
the territorial nature of these rights and therefore was not the major problem it is today.
Even if activities outside the territory resulted in infringement inside the territory, its
economic impact was significantly less than it is today due to the very narrow and local
characteristics of the markets. The significant development of international trade and
commerce, the opening of borders for transition of goods, and the development of digital
infrastructure changed this reality. Arguably, since reality changed, the law should as well.
The Brussels Convention addresses specific intellectual property rights such as patents,
trademarks, designs, and other similar rights required to be deposited or registered. In
that respect, it provides that "the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or
registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an international
convention deemed to have taken place" 36 shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
domicile. This provision is instructive as to its scope, but it is limited to patents, trademarks, designs, or other similar rights, which traditionally need to be registered or depos32. See Brussels Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(3).
33. See id. art. 27(5).
34. See id. art. 30.
35. The Brussels Convention provides requirements that need to be followed before the judgment can be
enforced. See id. art. 26. The enforcing party must provide the enforcing court with an authenticated copy of
the judgment and some evidence that the judgment is enforceable in the rendering state. Id. art. 46(1). In
case of a default judgment, proof of service of the originating party must be provided. Id. art 46(2). The
party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any
submissions on the application, and the decision should be given promptly. Id. art. 34. As soon as the order
of enforcement is rendered, it must be served on the debtor, and the latter has one month to appeal the
decision. Id. art 36. No enforcement measures other than protective ones can be taken during that period,
and until the appeal process is concluded. Id. art. 39.
36. Id. art. 16(4).
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ited. 37 The drafters of the convention did not specifically address copyrights or other
rights that need no deposit or registration. Furthermore, even with respect to patents and
trademarks, Article 16 is limited to certain kinds of disputes, namely proceedings concerned with registration or validity. Consequently, one may argue that disputes concerning infringement of the rights are left outside the scope of Article 16.
Can we conclude that only matters of validity or registration are addressed in the Brussels Convention? Is there no way available under the Brussels Convention to enforce
judgments involving infringement of intellectual property rights?
Professor Ulmer has argued the following:
An action for infringement of copyright or of an industrial property right may, therefore, be instituted both in the contracting state in which the defendant is domiciled
and in the contracting state in which the damage or injury has occurred. The fact
that Articles 2 and 5(3) of the Convention are applicable also to actions based on
industrial property rights (and correspondingly on copyright) may be conclusively
deduced from the fact that in Article 16 exclusive jurisdiction is provided only for
actions concerning the validity or registration of industrial property rights, whereas
38
in other respects the general rules as to jurisdiction are to suffice.
But, one may argue that only the courts in the country of registration should adjudicate
questions of intellectual property right infringement because accepting such jurisdiction
necessitates a judgment on the validity of the foreign intellectual property right. That
decision is more appropriate for the courts of the protecting country to render. Indeed,
39
that was the approach taken by the U.S. courts for many years.
Like Professor Ulmer, it is this writer's opinion that the more accurate interpretation of
the Brussels Convention is that jurisdiction in intellectual property infringement cases
should be governed by its general provisions. Article 16 of the Brussels Convention is a
so-called lex speicalis, which is intended to govern only specific kinds of disputes, such as
validity and registration, and therefore specifically excluded the question of infringement
from its scope. However, there is no indication in the general part of the Brussels Convention that it was not intended to regulate intellectual property infringement cases.
When it was intended to leave out certain disputes, it was done clearly with no hesitation.
Having said that, from a policy perspective, it would be preferable to consolidate the
hearing on the issue of validity with that regarding infringement, and have the same court
assert jurisdiction. In almost every intellectual property case, the defendant raises both
issues as a defense (i.e., invalidity of the right and non-infringement) thus requiring the

court to address them, and therefore it makes more sense to have one court decide both
questions. Needless to say that such an approach will be substantially more efficient and
save the parties, as well as the courts involved, substantial valuable resources, such as
money and time.
37. See id. There are exceptions to this general rule, such as the acquisition of trademarks by using the
mark in commerce.
38. EUGEN ULIER, INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TIHE CONFLICT OF, LAWS: A STUDY CARRIED OLr FOR THE COMMISSION OF THIE EUROPEAN COMsIMUNITIES, DIRECTrORATE-GENERAL FOR INT ER
NATIONAL MARKET AND INDUsTRIAL AFFAIRS 16 (1978).

39. See Ortman v. Stanway Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 158 (7th Cir. 1967); Vanity Fair Mills Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956).
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The Lugano Convention

Because the Brussels Convention was only open to Member States of the European
Union, other European countries, such as members of the European Free Trade Associa4°
tion (EFTA), could not use the jurisdiction and enforcement system established by the
Brussels Convention although they have relatively free access to European markets. The
desire to increase the number of Member States that could use these rules led to the
creation of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
41
Commercial Matters (the "Lugano Convention") of September 16, 1988, signed by the
members of EFTA and the EU. The Lugano Convention is a parallel convention to the
Brussels Convention, and it contains substantially the same rules of jurisdiction and recog42
nition. It refers to persons that are domiciled in EFTA Member States. If differences in
the texts of the two conventions exist, they are usually intended to reflect interpretations
of the Brussels Convention provided by the European Court of Justice in the twenty years
43
that elapsed between the signing of the two instruments.
There are two main differences, however, between the Brussels Convention and the
Lugano Convention that should be noted. First, enforcement of a judgment rendered
against a domiciliary of an EFTA state may be refused if the rendering court did not have
44
Second, the enforcing court
jurisdiction under the terms of the Lugano Convention.
may refuse to do so if the rendering court assumed jurisdiction in accordance with another

convention, the enforcing court is not a Member of that convention, and the defendant is
domiciled in the enforcing state.
3.

45

The Brussels Regulation

Despite the relative success of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, members of the
46
EU have agreed to revise some of these rules in the Brussels Regulation, which was
47
The new Brussels Regulation
intended to replace parts of the Brussels Convention.
determines the international jurisdiction of courts in the EU countries that adopted it and
introduces a new and more expeditious procedure for recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments.
40. The current EFTA members are Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. For more information, see the EFTA Secretariat's official website: http://secretariat.efta.int/.
41. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16,
1988, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
42. Both the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention are double conventions, which means that
both the jurisdiction issue, according to which the courts of the contracting states act, as well as the conditions for recognition of the judgments issued, are regulated. See Kessedjian, supra note 3, at 1.
43. See PARK & CROMIE, supra note 9, at 5.
44. See Lugano Convention, sitpra note 41, art. 54(b)(3).
45. See id. art. 57(4).
46. Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L12) 44 [hereinafter Brussels
Regulation].
47. The EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Poland) are still part of the
Lugano Convention. Because it has opted out of the Brussels Regulation, Denmark will continue to follow
the rules of the Brussels Convention in its relationship with the EU countries. Id. recitals 21-22.
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Adoption of the Brussels Regulation does "not affect rules governing jurisdiction and
the recognition of judgments contained in specific Community instruments." 48 It specifically excludes "revenue, customs or administrative matters" and does not apply to the
status or legal capacity of natural persons (including wills and succession), bankruptcy
proceedings, social security, or arbitration. 49 It does apply, however, in all other "civil and
commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal," including intellectual
property.50 Jurisdiction under the rules of the Brussels Regulation is determined according to the country where defendant is domiciled. 5 1 Domicile is determined based on the
laws of the courts of the country first seized. If legal firms or other artificial entities are
involved, domicile is determined based on the country where they have their statutory
seat, central administration, or principal place of business. The general rule under the
Brussels Regulation is that persons should be sued in the courts of the Member State in
which they are domiciled. There are several provisions within the Brussels Regulation
that provide for Special Jurisdiction. When contracts are involved, the jurisdiction will be
that of the country of performance. The place of performance in the case of the sale of
goods shall be determined based on the place where the goods "were delivered or should
have been delivered" and, in cases of the provision of services, the place where "the services were provided or should have been provided." 52 In torts cases, the courts of the
53
country where the harmful event occurred or may occur have jurisdiction.
The Brussels Regulation also addresses the issue of contractual agreements with respect
to jurisdiction (i.e., court selection clauses). In cases where the parties to the contract
agreed on a certain jurisdiction to settle any dispute that may arise with respect to this
specific relationship, the courts of that jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction unless
the parties agreed otherwise.5 4 Such agreement must be in writing, but a writing may be
defined as "[a]ny communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of
the agreement."5 5 This groundbreaking definition is very significant in the sense that it
allows for electronic commerce to take place, and it makes it easier for electronic contracts
(click-wrap) to exist.
4. The Montevideo Convention
The Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards signed in Montevideo on May 8, 1979 (the "Montevideo Convention") is
56
an example of a regional instrument that was based on the simple convention model.
57
This convention was ratified and is now in force in nine countries. The purpose of the
Montevideo Convention is to ensure the extraterritorial validity of judgments and arbitral
48. Brussels Regulation, supra note 46, recital 24.
49. Id. art. 1.
50. Id.

51. Nationality of the defendant is not a consideration. Id. art. 2.
52. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
53. Id. art. 5(3).

54. Id. art. 23.
55. Id. art. 23(2).
56. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards,
May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224 (1979), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-41.htnl
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
57. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
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awards in the Member Countries.58 It applies substantially "to judgments and arbitral
awards rendered in civil, commercial or labor proceedings in one of the States Parties, " 59
subject to certain reservations they can make. The instrument contains a set of conditions
that, if met, gives the judgment extraterritorial effect in all of the Member Countries.
Most pertinent is the fact that the Montevideo Convention does not regulate the issue of
jurisdiction. The only reference to jurisdiction can be found in Article 2, which requires
the enforcing court as a condition for enforcement of the foreign judgment to verify that
the rendering judge or tribunal was competent "in the international sphere" to provide the
judgment "in accordance with the law of the State in which the judgment ... is to take
effect" 60 , and any debate regarding the potential bases for the assertion of jurisdiction is
absent.
A development took place in 1984 that may provide us with an indication about the
superiority of the simple convention model. In that year, there was an attempt to complement the Montevideo Convention with a new convention that attempted to regulate the
issue of indirect jurisdiction. This was the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in
the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments (the "La
Paz Convention") that was signed in La Paz, Bolivia, on May 24, 1984.61 The purpose of
the La Paz Convention was to complement the Montevideo Convention and provide a set
of bases for jurisdiction that, if complied with, satisfied the jurisdiction requirement under
Article 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention previously discussed. 62 The La Paz Convention was signed by thirteen countries but was ratified at first only by Mexico in 1987 and
did not come into effect until twenty years after its adoption by the ratification of Uruguay
in 2004.63 In other words, once these countries tried to replace the simple convention
model with a double convention model that also regulated the issue of jurisdiction, the
whole structure collapsed.
B.

FAILURE OF PAST

ATTmP'TS

TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

The Brussels, Lugano, and Montevideo Conventions and the Brussels Regulation are all
regional instruments that, at least to some extent, successfully regulated the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. On the other hand, except for these regional and
other bilateral instruments, there is no single international instrument that regulates this
issue. There were several comprehensive attempts to regulate this problem from an international perspective, especially in the last three decades, but they all failed. 64
58. Id pmbl.
59. Id. art. 1.
60. Id. art. 2.
61. Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity
of Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 468, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/
b-50.html [hereinafter La Paz Convention].
62. Id. art. 1
63. Id. Notably, both Mexico and Uruguay declared at the time of ratification that they will apply this
instrument to determine the validity of the "competence in the international sphere" standard articulated in
Article 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention without prejudice to their ability to order the application of the
La Paz Convention independently.
64. For more information about attempts made during the first part of the 20th century to create such an
international treaty by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, seeHague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Catherine Kessedjian, InternationalJurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
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1. The 1971 Hague Convention
In February 1971, the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "1971 Hague Convention") was
65
introduced under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
But, the 1971 Hague Convention never went into effect because only three countries
ratified it.66 The reasons for the reluctance of the various countries to join the 1971
Hague Convention as members are extremely important to this discussion.
The 1971 Hague Convention was drafted and structured in a very complicated manner.
For countries to achieve mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, joining the 1971 Hague Convention was not enough. Rather, in addition to joining, each
country had to negotiate a supplemental agreement with every other country-a requirement that created unnecessary complication. 67 One of the incentives for creating such an
instrument was to avoid the complexity of bilateral negotiations, and indeed, this "method
of bilateralisation" is considered one of the major obstacles preventing countries from
68
joining the 1971 Hague Convention.
Another reason that arguably affected the decision of countries not to join the 1971
Hague Convention was the signing of the Brussels Convention. Many of the countries
that participated in the negotiations of the 1971 Hague Convention were European countries that were also members of the Brussels Convention and later the Lugano Convention. From their perspective, joining these two more favorable conventions eliminated, to
a great extent, the need for such an international instrument.
Some believe, however, that the real reason for the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention to accomplish its goals is the fact that it failed to address the issue of jurisdiction. It
was the European countries that objected to the idea that the convention "could not deal
with provisions regulating the jurisdiction of each State, and that they had no authority to
negotiate on restrictions of the bases of internal jurisdiction. ' '69 Naturally, not all legal
systems are the same, and there is a lot of criticism and mutual suspicion. Most countries
simply disfavored the idea of an automatic recognition rule that would require them to
give up their right to review decisions of an unknown foreign judge before they were
obligated to enforce it.70 Consequently, the relatively mild tension and general lack of
suspicion among the European countries during the negotiations of the Brussels ConvenMatters, Prel. Doc. 7 (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm-pd7.pdf [hereinafter
Document Seven].
65. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S.249 , available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.pdf&
cid=78 [hereinafter 1971 Hague Convention].
66. Netherlands, Cypress, and Portugal have ratified the 1971 Hague Convention, while Kuwait is a party
to the convention by accession. See Status Table, Convention of I February 1971 on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/index
_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78.
67. See 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 65, art. 21-23.
68. See Document Seven, supra note 64, at 8.
69. Struyven, npra note 8. See also Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J.
Lh'r'L. L. 111, 112 (1998).
70. Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at theHague Conference, 26 BROOK. J.
NrT'L. L. 949, 952 (2001).
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tion can be used as a possible explanation of its comparative success and the existence of
such tension as a reason for the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention.71
2.

The Hague Draft Negotiations

The United States is not a member of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. This fact
raised concerns in the American government that U.S. citizens could be sued in EU countries and exposed to national jurisdiction in these countries. The American government
was not ready to have foreign judgments recognized in the United States while American
judgments are not recognized and enforced abroad, thus putting Americans at a disadvantage.7 2 Consequently, twenty-one years after the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention,
the U.S. State Department initiated negotiations for a new international instrument,
which resulted in the Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Preliminary Hague Draft"),73 again
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.74 In October
1999, the Special Commission adopted the Preliminary Hague Draft, 7 S and this was followed by a meeting of experts in order "to examine the issues raised by electronic commerce in relation to the international jurisdiction of the courts." 76 In June 2001, a new
version of the Preliminary Hague Draft was proposed (the "2001 Hague Draft"), which
77
will now be reviewed.
Historically, when the work on the Preliminary Hague Draft started in 1992, the purpose was to create an international instrument that would address disputes involving traditional services and physical goods. Only in a later stage were the problems accompanying
the introduction of the internet, intellectual property, and information first taken into
consideration. Although mainly based on the model set forth in the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions, the Preliminary Hague Draft was not exactly a double convention because it
also allowed the assertion of jurisdiction under national law, even with regards to Contracting States. It also avoided establishing a hierarchy with regards to the different types
of jurisdiction, unlike the Brussels and Lugano Conventions that adopted a fundamental
71. Catherine Kessedjian rightfully indicated that the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and the 1971
Hague Convention regulate first and foremost the issue of jurisdiction and only later the issue of recognition
and enforcement of the resulting judgments. See Document Seven, suipra note 64, at 9.
72. See Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdictionand Enforcement of Judgments, 95 Am.J.
I-l 'L L. 418, 419 (2001).
73. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-drafte.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary
Hague Draft],. The latest version of the convention was prepared by the Permanent Bureau in 2001. See
Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Permanent Bureau & the Co-Reporters, Summary of the Outcome of
the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diploniatic Conference 6-20 June 2001, available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm200ldraft-e.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Hague Draft].
74. For more elaboration on the history of the Preliminary Hague Draft, see Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual
Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Draft Hague Jurisdictionand Judgments Convention, 62 U.
Pri-T. L. REv. 581 (2001).
75. Fritz Blumer, Jurisdictionand Recognition
in TransatlanticPatent Litigation, 9 Tx. LNrELL. PROP. L.J.
329, 385 (2001).
76. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Catherine Kessedjian, Electronic Commerce and International
Jurisdiction:Summary of Discoissions,3 Prel. Doc. 12 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
jdgmpdl2.pdf.
77. 2001 Hague Draft, supra note 73.
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jurisdiction based on the domicile
of the defendant with all other bases of jurisdictions as
78
exceptions to the general rule.

The 2001 Hague Draft mentions three different kinds of jurisdiction, but substantively
deals with only two of them. In general, it sets forth in Articles 3 through 16 a list of bases
for asserting jurisdiction. Resulting judgments can be recognized and enforced in other
Contracting States, subject to exceptions for due process of law, public policy, and the
need to avoid inconsistent judgments. 79 Article 18 lists "[p]rohibited grounds of jurisdiction," which are not covered under the 2001 Hague Draft, such as the nationality of the
plaintiff, the nationality of the defendant, the domicile, habitual or temporary residence,
and presence of the plaintiff in the state.80 If a judgment is based on one of these prohibited bases for jurisdiction, the judgment is unrecognizable and unenforceable in other
Contracting States. Article 17, however, allows the application of "jurisdiction based on
national law," subject to some conditions and provided that the above-mentioned Article
18 does not prohibit it.5l

As mentioned above, the 2001 Hague Draft is based on a model that requires the enforcing court to recognize or enforce a judgment2 rendered in another Contracting State
if the judgment was based on one of the grounds of jurisdiction provided in the document
itself. Section 25(1) of the 2001 Hague Draft provides that "[a] judgment based on a
ground of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, or which is consistent with any such
ground, shall be recognised or enforced under this Chapter."83 The 2001 Hague Draft
provides us with a broad basis for enforcement of judgments. In fact, it all comes down to
a single question: whether the rendering court had the right to assert jurisdiction under
the bases for jurisdiction provided therein.
During the negotiation period, a fierce debate developed as to the benefit of including
intellectual property rights within the scope of the proposed convention.84 The intangibility of the subject matter, the territoriality of the law, and the cultural context of its
application create various problems that should be addressed. Several commentators even
85
suggested that intellectual property rights should be excluded from the convention.
78. Nygh & Pocar, supra note 14, at 28.
79. 2001 Hague Draft, supra note 73, art. 3-16 (Article 3: habitual residence of the defendant; Article 4:
jurisdiction set in an agreement; Article 5: appearance by the defendant in court without contesting jurisdiction; Articles 6, 7, and 8: jurisdiction relating to contracts; Article 10: jurisdiction relating to torts; Article 11:
jurisdiction relating to trusts; Article 12: jurisdiction relating to patents and trade marks).
80. Id.art. 18.
17.
81. Id.art.
82. Article 23 of the 2001 Hague Draft defines judgment as "any decision given by a court, whatever it may
be called, including a decree or order, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the
court, provided that it relates to a decision which may be recognised or enforced under the Convention." Id.
art. 23.
83. Id.art. 25(1).
84. See id. at n.80.
85. E-mail from James Love to Mary Streett and Jeff Kovar, [Random Bits] Hague Treaty: IPR Issues and
January 30-31 WIPO Meeting (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http:/lists.essential.org/pipermaillrandom-bits/
2000-September/000362.html. Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg have suggested that should the intellectual
property rights issue be excluded from the final draft of the Hague Convention, we could instead adopt a
unique convention under the auspices of WIPO or the WTO that would deal with the recognition and
enforcement of judgments enforcing these rights. Such a convention would be more suitable to address all
the delicate problems that are unique to intellectual property rights and could better defend the interests of
the creative community. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdictionand
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Others have suggested that the need for such an international convention is diminishing
because players in the digital world manage, or are forced to find ways to do without
litigation to address civil wrongs.8 6 Indeed, in the discussions of the Special Commission
87
in March 1998, the intellectual property subject was not even specifically discussed. Articles 12(4) and 12(5) of the 2001 Hague Draft adopt a broad and territorial approach by
giving the country granting the right or the country where the right is registered the
exclusive right to control not only the act of registration, revocation, and abandonment of
the right, but also the opportunity to control its infringement.88 By using this language,
almost any dispute with regards to patents, trademarks, or other related rights would be
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in the country where the right was granted or
registered, or, in the case of an unregistered mark, the country where the right arose. The
rationale and basis for this broad rule is quite obvious. The registration and acknowledgement of intellectual property rights is a very complicated process. In fact, even within the
registration country, the people that practice this field of law are required to develop
special expertise. In many countries, due to the difficulty and uniqueness of the field of
intellectual property law, decisions and proceedings regarding intellectual property rights
are taking place not in regular civil courts but rather in special courts or agencies that have
the required knowledge and expertise to solve the difficult problems.8 9 The substantive
law and the registration process with regards to intellectual property rights can vary
greatly from one country to the other.90 Thus, the most convenient and appropriate forum to handle this kind of litigation would be the country where the right was registered
or granted. This forum is where the judges are more familiar with the relevant legislation
and case law and have the best interpretation tools to reach a just solution, making the
litigation process shorter and less expensive. Furthermore, in most intellectual property
disputes, both the issues of validity and infringement arise, and thus it makes more sense
not to separate the determination and adjudication of these two questions between two
courts.
The Brussels Convention separated the question of registration and validity of the rights
from the question of infringement. According to the view of the drafters of the Brussels
Convention, the grant of intellectual property rights is "an exercise of sovereignty and,
therefore, a decision as to the validity of the right should only be determined by the courts
of the state which granted the right."91 When drafting the 2001 Hague Draft, there was
Recognition ofJudgments in IntellectualPropertyMatters, 77 Cpn.-KFNr L. REv. 1065 (2002), available at http://
www.kentlaw.edu/depts/ipp/intl-courts/docs/treatyl 0 10.pdf.
86. Jonathan A. Franklin & Roberta J. Morris, InternationalJurisdictionand Enforcement of Judgments in the
Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of Goals for, and Comments on the Current Proposals, 77 Ci i.-KEvsm L. REV.
1213, 1221-22 (2002).
87. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work oftbe Special Commission of March 1998 on InternationalJurisdiction and Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Prel. Doc. 9 July 1998), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd9.pdf.
88. 2001 Hague Draft, supra note 73, art. 12(4)-(5).
89. Examples of these special courts that decide intellectual property cases are the Patents and Trademarks
Registrar in Israel, and the Patents and Trademark Office, or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
the United States.
90. For example, the French legal system recognizes the moral rights of authors (droit moral) while the
American system does not.
91. William Aldous, The Brussels Convention: A New Convention Impinging on Disputeson JurisdictionIncluding
Those Relating To IntellectualProperty Litigation, 9 FED. CIi. BJ. 523, 524 (2000).
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no controversy among the experts with regards to the inclusion of exclusive jurisdiction
for proceedings relating to the validity of the intellectual property rights. But, the inclusion of such exclusive jurisdiction with regards to the infringement of these rights was not
as clear. Several scholars suggested that there should be no difference between the decision on the registration and validity of the right and the decision on the infringement and
enforcement of the right. 92 They argued that the court in the country where the intellectual property rights were registered should exclusively decide both questions. They suggested that since a patent is a right to prevent others from using the invention, the fact
that the right is not infringed is just as important as the fact that the right is not properly
registered. In both situations, the holder of the claimed patent right would be unable to
enjoy the privileges that are attached to a patent right (i.e., preventing others from using
the invention). Thus, if the granting of the patent is considered to be a sovereign act, why
should the enforcement of the patent not be considered similarly?
The Dutch Court of Appeals has adopted the latter approach. 93 It argued that infringement and nullity of a patent are closely linked since it is impossible to infringe on a patent
that is null and void and thus nonexistent. For example, a court that is asked to decide the
merits of an infringement claim will most likely have to stay the proceedings until another
court in a different jurisdiction (e.g., the jurisdiction in which the right is registered)
reaches a decision on the nullity of the patent claim that was brought by another party,
unless it is absolutely clear from the beginning that the nullity claim in the other court is
baseless, which is very hard to determine with a full trial. Consequently, it has been suggested that "the separate hearing and settlement of the infringement issue and nullity issue
by two different national courts is far from ideal. It would be desirable for the infringement and nullity issues to be decided by the same court."94 The 2001 Hague Draft, however, took a different path. It added a second alternative in Article 12(5)A, which
acknowledges that with respect to infringement of patents, trademarks, designs, or other
similar rights, the country of registration or grant does not have exclusive jurisdiction, and
other bases for jurisdiction may apply.95 In other words, they preferred the approach
under which the questions of validity and infringement are not necessarily connected, and
there is no exclusive jurisdiction to the court of the state where the right is registered.
From the explanatory notes in the 2001 Hague Draft, it remains unclear whether it was
to eventually apply to copyrights. There were several proposals regarding the inclusion of
copyrights, and the last version excluded copyrights from Article 12. There was still, however, a proposal to give exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning the infringement
of copyrights to the courts of the State "under whose laws the copyright or the neighboring right is claimed to be infringed." 96 Excluding copyrights from the scope of Article 12
of the 2001 Hague Draft does not mean that one cannot recognize or enforce judgments
relating to copyrights. One can still do so if the suit is brought in accordance with the
rules of jurisdiction provided in Article 10 of the 2001 Hague Draft relating to torts.
92. See id.
93. Expandable Grafts P'ship v. Boston Scientific B.V., 11999] F.S.R. 352 (Ct. App. The Hague).
94. Id. at 361.
95. "In relation to proceedings which have as their object the infringement of patents, trademarks, designs
or other similar rights, the courts of the Contracting State referred to in the preceding paragraph [or in the
provisions of Articles [3-16]] have jurisdiction." 2001 Hague Draft, sitpra note 73, art. 12(5A), at 13.
96. Id. at 14 n.87.
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By excluding copyrights from Article 12 of the 2001 Hague Draft, the drafters selected
the easy solution of ignoring the problem, even though at the beginning of the third
millennium, copyright infringement is becoming one of the most important problems that
the intellectual property world is facing. The internet created a reality where the dissemination of information and the copying and distribution of copyrighted works is done without anyone being able to control it. One cannot ignore the fact that millions of
copyrighted works, such as pictures, movies, and music, are being transferred daily among
internet "surfers" all around the world without the right-holders' permission, thus resulting in copyright infringement. In order to maintain the balance between the need to
encourage creativity by securing property rights for inventors and creators on one hand
and, on the other hand, the desire to enrich the public domain, the society, and the culture
we live in by limiting the scope of protection, we have to maintain a system where a rightholder can turn to a court and get a judgment protecting her rights and then enable her to
enforce it in another country. Thus, it would be extremely unwise to simply ignore the
problem of enforcement of judgments relating to copyrighted works at this point.

3. The 2004 Hague Draft
In June 2001, the Hague Conference met to discuss the future of the aforementioned

Judgments Project. The delegations confirmed their dedication to the project in principle
but decided that the Diplomatic Session could not be held before the end of 2002. It was
clear from the ongoing negotiations at that point that an understanding and agreement on
the jurisdiction issue could not be expected in the near future. The U.S. delegation was
one of the fiercest opponents to the proposed 2001 Hague Draft, and its representative

said that "the US could not become a Party to a convention structured along the lines of
the preliminary draft Convention. In particular, the United States could not accept (in
personam) jurisdiction in infringement on IP rights cases over a defendant who had no
relation with the jurisdiction." 9 7 Very importantly, representatives of the U.S. delegation
said that they prefer "to focus on those elements of the [2001 Hague Draft] that are
98
achievable now and forgo those other elements until the time is right to address them."
Consequently, the participants have decided to narrow the scope of the negotiations,
believing that by addressing specific problems with a narrower scope, there are better
chances they may actually agree on some issues so that an international instrument may
finally become possible. To try and address this lack of agreement, the Hague Permanent
Bureau has set up a new Informal Working Group in an attempt to prepare a new instru99
ment on this issue that would be submitted to the Special Commission for discussion.
97. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Report of the Experts Meeting on the IntellectualProperty Aspects of
the Future Convention on Jntrisdiction and Foreign Judgnents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 3, Prel. Doc. 13
(Apr. 2001), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgmpd 13 .pdf.
98. William New, E-Commerce: U.S. May Face Opposition on Narrow JurisdictionalTreaty, NATr'L JOURNAL'S
TEci-IN. DAILY (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/techapril02.html (quoting Jeffrey Kovar, Head of U.S. Delegation to the Hague Conference). Most other counmtries, including
Australia, Canada, the EU, and Japan, took a different approach and preferred a more comprehensive solution
along the lines of the 2001 Hague Draft.
99. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, PreliminaryResult ofthe Work of the Informal Working Group on
the Judgments Project, Prel. Doc. 8 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff..pd08e.
pdf.
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The parties have agreed that further, more limited negotiations should take place1 0° The
purpose was to present a text "with a sufficient prospect of reaching agreement."10 ,
The result, however, was a limited convention so skeletal that it only regulates recognition and enforcement of judgments in which the jurisdiction of the rendering court was
based on an "exclusive choice of court agreement" 02 between the parties (the "New
Hague Convention"). The New Hague Convention does not apply to forum selection
agreements to which a consumer (defined as a natural person acting primarily for personal, family, or household purposes) is a party.' 03 Even this instrument, 104 despite being
so narrow in scope, was not favorably accepted and drew substantial criticism from scholars and various interest groups around the world, primarily due to the fact that it applies
to non-negotiated contracts and does not exclude contracts to which small businesses and
non-profit organizations are parties.
The mechanism under which the New Hague Convention operates is quite simple. A
judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of
court agreement is almost always recognized. 05 The enforcing court is not authorized to
review the merits of the judgment given by the court of origin and is bound by the findings of fact the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by
default.' 06 A judgment shall be recognized only if it has effect in the State of origin and
shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin. 07 Furthermore,
"[r]ecognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment is the subject
of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not
expired[;] [a] refusal does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment."08 These rules:
100. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Some Reflections on the Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of the Conference, 4, submitted by the Permanent
Bureau, Prel. Doc. 16 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/vop/gen-pdl6e.pdf.
101. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Andrea Schulz, Report on the Second Meeting of the Informal
Working Group on the Judgments Project, 4, Prel. Doc. 21 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/jdgmpd2 le.pdf.
102. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 3(a)-(b), June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98 [hereinafter New Hague Convention]. This
term is defined as an agreement by two or more parties that is concluded or documented in writing; or by any
other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; and designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. A choice of court agreement which
designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State shall
be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.
103. See id. art. 2.
104. The New Hague Convention does not apply to matters relating to "the validity of intellectual property
rights other than copyright and related rights;" or to "infringement of intellectual property rights other than
copyright and related rights, except where infringement proceedings are brought for breach of a contract
between the parties relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract." Id.
Other matters that are excluded from the scope of the New Hague Convention are, inter alia, the status and
legal capacity of natural persons; maintenance obligations; wills and succession; insolvency, composition, and
analogous matters; marine pollution; antitrust (competition) matters; and liability for nuclear damage. Id.
105. Id. art. 8(1).
106. Id. art. 8(2).
107. Id. art. 8(3).
108. Id. art. 8(4).
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[A]lso apply to a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State pursuant to a
transfer of the case from the chosen court in that Contracting State[.] ... However,
where the chosen court had discretion as to whether to transfer the case to another
court, recognition or enforcement of the judgment may be refused against a party
who objected to the transfer in a timely manner in the State of origin.' °9
There are several types of issues excluded from the scope of the New Hague Convention. These include, among others, "the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
maintenance obligations; family law matters; wills and succession; and insolvency, composition and analogous matters.""10 Interestingly, and one may add not surprisingly, the
language of the New Hague Convention specifically excludes "the validity of intellectual
property rights other than copyright and related rights" as well as "infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights, except where infringement
proceedings are brought for breach of a contract between the parties relating to such
rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract.""'
Like in most similar instruments previously proposed, a list of exceptions to the general
enforcement rule is provided. 112 In these situations, the reviewing court has the right to
refuse to recognize or enforce the foreign judgment rendered by the original court.' 3
These exceptions include situations where the choice of court agreement was "null and
void;" a party lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement; situations when the defendant had no time or was not notified in a sufficient manner to be able to adequately assert
a defense; when "the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection in a matter of procedure;" when recognition or enforcement would be "manifestly incompatible" with public
policy of the enforcing court ("including situations where the specific proceedings leading
to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of
that State"); "the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested State in
a dispute between the same parties;" or "the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another State between the same parties on the same cause of action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the
14
requested State."''
The New Hague Convention may be viewed as a good start, but it also contains many
flaws. First, the scope of the proposed instrument is very narrow and therefore does not
really solve many of the problems associated with the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. In fact, it excludes from its scope all agreements "to which a natural
person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) is a
party," namely business to consumer (B2C) and consumer to consumer (C2C) agreements."15 Accounting for a small fraction of the number of contracts signed worldwide,
business to business (B2B) agreements, to which the New Hague Convention applies, are
usually made by sophisticated parties who engage in extensive negotiations, many times
with the assistance of attorneys who can find ways to protect their clients' interests, for
109. Id. art. 8(5).
110. Id. art. 2.
111. Id.

112. Id. art. 9.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
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example, through guarantees and letters of credits. The number of agreements to which
the New Hague Convention does not apply is expected to grow in the future when online
trade develops and the number of agreements signed through the Internet grows.
Second, the application of this convention to intellectual property rights is very limited.
It was at first decided that copyrights shall be included within the scope of the proposed
instrument, but patents, trademarks (both registered and unregistered), and other registered industrial property rights shall be excluded from its scope.1 16 Later, there was a shift
in this approach, and a call was made to include other forms of intellectual property rights
as well. 17 The idea of including intellectual property rights within the scope of the New
Hague Convention was based on the fact that tiis issue usually arises with respect to
license agreements between commercially sophisticated parties who tend to know the risks
involved and take them into consideration.] 18 Therefore, courts should enforce such
choice-of-court provisions just as they enforce arbitration clauses.' 19 Finally, only validity
and infringement of copyrights and related rights remained within the scope of the New
Hague Convention. 120 There seemed to be an agreement that the issue of validity of
other intellectual property rights should remain out of the convention's scope. 12' The
issue of validity is unique in the sense that every decision has implications on the registration authorities in the country that originally registered the right. If a trademark or a
patent were registered in one country after thorough investigation by the relevant authorities, and they concluded that the applicant was entitled to such rights, it would be very
difficult for that country to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment in which the foreign
court decided that the trademark right registered in the enforcing country was invalid.
One may view this as major interference with the authority and sovereignty of the country
of registration. Furthermore, many believe that the courts of the country of registration
are the most suitable to address the issue of the validity of the registered right, as they are
the ones with the most expertise. Indeed, the negotiating parties agreed that "it could be
made clear that any judgment rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause would not
have any effect on registration authorities or, in the case of an unregistered trademark, on
the validity of the mark as such."122
Notably, Article 2(3) of the New Hague Convention provides that validity issues,
among others, are not excluded from the scope of the convention where they arise
"merely as a preliminary question and not as an object of the proceedings" (e.g., invalidity
defense in a patent or trademark infringement case).1 23 Resulting judgments shall, however, be limited in scope and effect only to the parties involved (in personam rather than
in rem).
Third, even if the scope of the proposed convention is limited to B2B agreements, there
are still some problems that may arise as a result of the existence of the internet. For
example, when click-wrap agreements are involved or when the agreement contains prohi116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Schulz, svpra note 102, at 11.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 12.
New Hague Convention, supra note 103, art. 2(2)(n).
See Schulz, supra note 102, at 11-12.
Id.
New Hague Convention, supra note 103, art. 2(3).
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bition on deep linking to other websites, there is always a fear that by agreeing to enforce
two parties' agreement that a certain jurisdiction shall adjudicate their disputes, we provide the stronger party with an unjustified advantage. The stronger party can dictate a
forum where certain acts are prohibited and thus achieve certain advantages in violation of
specific basic principles, such as the fair use doctrine or an American First Amendment
free speech type of argument.
As of March 2008 only one country (Mexico) has signed an accession document, and the
New Hague Convention is not in effect.
4. The Dreyfuss-GinsburgProposal
In a forum in Geneva that took place on January 30 and 31, 2001, Professor Dreyfuss
and Professor Ginsburg introduced a new draft convention that tried to simplify some of
the problems associated with the recognition and enforcement of judgments in intellectual
property matters (the "Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal").' 24 They correctly suggested that
the creation of a special instrument that would specifically deal with intellectual property
rights, rather than a more general solution, is very important because it would increase
efficiency in solving intellectual property disputes by consolidating all the actions under
and
the jurisdiction of one court and enable us to take into account the unique aspects
5
characteristics of intellectual property rights derived from their intangibility.12
26
Similar to
This proposal is mainly based on the 2001 Hague Draft, discussed above,'
the 2001 Hague Draft, this proposal was also based on the principle that recognition and
enforcement of the judgment depends on the question of whether the rendering court had
an approved basis of jurisdiction over the litigants. 127 The changes in this proposal result
from the need to adjust the 2001 Hague Draft to the special needs and uniqueness of the
2
creative community.1 s
In general, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal would be only open to countries that have
joined the WTO and would cover the same scope of rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement.' 29 There is one possible exception to this general rule, which concerns patent litigation.' 30 The reason for this exception is that patents are presumably more territorial in
nature than other intellectual property rights, and, other than software and business methods, most of the other patent infringements are unlikely to take place in cyberspace. Because of the expertise required in this field and the infrequent incidence of simultaneous
multinational infringements, it is most likely that the benefit would not cover the costs
involved.'13
This approach, which excludes most patent litigation from the proposed convention, is
somewhat problematic. Patent litigation is among the most important issues in the modem intellectual property world, especially since the birth of the internet and the intense
development of new technologies in computers, optics, and biotech, the bellwethers of the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85.
Id.at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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high-tech revolution of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century. In fact, it
is not even clear that if it were not for the growing interest in this subject (e.g., protection
through patents of business methods and software) that scholars would have taken the
time to study this subject and try to find a solution by reaching an international understanding regarding the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to intellectual
property rights. It would not be unreasonable to predict that in the next few years, controversies with regard to patents are going to be a main part of intellectual property litigation. The growth in internet usage and the globalization of economic markets makes it
imperative to deal with litigation that has international consequences, and the exclusion of
this significant subject from such convention might lessen the value of the whole
32
convention.
One may justifiably argue that even if patent litigation is eventually excluded from the
scope of an international convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, such an instrument must, at the minimum, allow an American-style "issue preclu33
sion" mechanism to be included in determining factual issues with respect to patents.
In other words, even if the enforcing court would not be obligated to recognize and enforce the legal findings of the foreign court, it could still make use of the factual findings
of the foreign court, thus saving both parties substantial time, money, and other resources
that would have been utilized to re-litigate these factual findings. This, however, depends
upon the conclusion that the foreign court follows basic notions of due process of law, as
reflected in international law, in making its factual findings. Adopting the issue preclusion
doctrine as applied in the United States and other common law countries can be of great
assistance to us, even if we eventually fail to achieve an understanding as to the requirements for an international convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. We can utilize it to take a factual determination of a foreign court and apply it to a
current dispute, even if the legal issues are contested, thus saving money, time, and other
valuable resources. For example, in In-Tech Marketing Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 134 the Federal
District Court for the District of New Jersey decided to grant issue preclusion to a decision rendered by a Dutch court, holding that a patent assignment agreement had been
dissolved due to failure to pay royalties. Since this was a claim for tortious interference
with contractual relations, and one of the elements of such a claim is the existence of an
agreement, the U.S. court used the Dutch court's factual finding that no agreement was in
135
effect to reject the claim.

132. A few scholars suggested that giving exclusive jurisdiction over patent litigation to the country where
the patent was registered, as suggested in the Preliminary Hague Draft, iswrong because it would "prevent
the development of methods for efficient adjudication of worldwide patent actions." Id. at 1098. But, in my
view, this is not a sufficient reason, and we can still reach the consolidation goal by litigating all the cases in
the country of registration, which would be a more reasonable solution, as discussed above.
133. Issue preclusion prevents parties from relitigating facts and issues that were fully litigated ina prior suit.
"Issue preclusion applies when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2)
was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." State v.Roberts, 2003
WvrL
22417247, *2(Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
134. In-Tech Mktg. Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D.NJ. 1989).
135. Id.
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With regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal supports a
much broader "set of fora with adjudicatory authority over the parties" 136 than the Brussels Convention and the 2001 Hague Draft. This means that in every set of facts more
than one court can assert jurisdiction over the parties. The idea behind the adoption of a
37
wide range of possible jurisdictions is the concept of "commitment to consolidation."'
The basis for this proposal is the assumption that courts throughout the world would
cooperate with each other and with the parties in order to find the best place to litigate the
entire dispute, allowing a relatively large number of potential jurisdictions. 138 It is therefore argued that this approach will give everyone greater flexibility in resolving intellectual
139
property disputes.
Once again, one can disagree. The assumption that courts and parties would cooperate
in order to find the most convenient forum is, with all due respect, somewhat naive. In
fact, the reality is quite the opposite. In litigation, defense attorneys, in most cases, do
everything they possibly can to avoid or delay the trial, especially if they have sufficient
financial resources, and certainly do not cooperate with plaintiff in her attempt to move
the litigation forward. Furthermore, '"orumnon-conveniens" is a well known term in private international law.140 But, in many cases and for various reasons, courts in different
countries ignore this rule. They do not do it directly, but rather prefer to be more gentle,
and do it indirectly by means of interpretation and by distinguishing between different
cases -nd factual circumstances. Many times courts weigh various considerations that do
not necessarily directly relate to the dispute, even if they do not publicly admit it. Naturally, courts have the tendency to try and assist their native participants, and many times
plaintiffs forum shop for the one that will best protect their interests-pursuits that some
say should be discouraged. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that a plaintiff who selected
a specific forum for its own convenience would cooperate, as in the above-mentioned
assumption, with any attempt to send same plaintiff to another, less favorable court.14'
Like the 2001 Hague Draft, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal is structured as a mixed
convention.142 It lists bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, and if a court having a legiti143
mate jurisdiction renders a judgment, the courts of all Member States should enforce it.
It also lists bases of jurisdiction that are prohibited in cases that involve parties who are
foreign habitual residents of Member States, and it leaves the Member States with discretion as to the conditions that would apply in the enforcement of judgments predicated on
other bases of jurisdiction. 144
136. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 1069.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See generally, Brenda Tiffany Dieck, Reevaluating the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Multiterritorial
CopyrightInfringement Cases, 74 WASH. L. REv.127 (1999) (exploring the doctrine and arguing that it is being
abused in multi-territorial copyright suits).
141. Dreyfuss and Ginsburg acknowledge the forum shopping problem, but since they think that with respect to intellectual property matters "disputes cannot, in any event, be controlled through personal jurisdiction rules," they decide to refrain from solving it. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 1069 ("intangible
rights and infringements can be reified in too many locations to make personal jurisdiction an effective limit
on potential fora").
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Article 3 gives general jurisdiction to the courts of the country where the defendant is
habitually residing. 145 The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal also acknowledges the growing
tendency among parties to reach an agreement that a certain court or arbitral body will
have jurisdiction over disputes arising between them and gives these agreements full valid14 6
ity.
This is the same idea of the New Hague Convention previously discussed. 147
Special consideration was given in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal to actions relating
to the infringement of intellectual property rights.148 As we recall, the question of jurisdiction in infringement actions was very controversial in the drafting of the 2001 Hague
Draft. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal allows a plaintiff to bring an action for infringement in the courts of the "State where [the] defendant substantially acted (including preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement," the "State to which the alleged
infringement was intentionally directed," or "any State in which the infringement
foreseeably occurred."' 49 A closer look at this proposal for jurisdiction in intellectual
property infringement cases reveals that almost every country that is somehow related to
the infringement can claim jurisdiction. In my view, this solution is far from perfect. This
is especially true with respect to intellectual property, as most intellectual property rights
(e.g., copyrights, patents, and trademarks) are territorial in nature. For example, if one
registers the trademark "Jeansie" for the manufacturing of jeans in Israel, it does not mean
that another person cannot register the same mark for jeans in Germany without violating
the Israeli trademark. As a result, there is no point in giving jurisdiction to litigate an
infringement claim to a jurisdiction that has nothing to do with the infringement simply
because the defendant happened to make all the preparatory acts in that jurisdiction's
territory. That country's court will be asked to protect intellectual property rights under
the laws of a foreign country and to interpret laws that the judges know nothing about and
in which they have no vested interest. This can also lead to strange situations and results.
For instance, in this example, it could be that defendant's jeans factory, in which jeans
pants with the logo trademark intended to the Israeli market, as well as the German market, are produced is located in Germany. Under the provisions of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
Proposal, the owner of the Israeli trademark can bring an action in Germany against the
German jeans manufacturer for trademark infringement in Israel, since the preparatory
acts took place in Germany, even though there is nothing wrong with the German jeans
manufacturer's activity in the jurisdiction in which the jeans is manufactured (i.e. Germany) and it is perfectly legal. Moreover, so many potential bases for exercising jurisdiction over a given dispute reduces certainty and efficiency -key elements in the
commercial and business world-and increases the transaction costs. Finally, as set forth
in more detail above, it is always preferable to have one court decide both the question of
validity of the right and the question of its infringement.
145. Article 3 (2) of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal provides that:
For the purposes of the Convention, an entity or person other than a natural person shall be considered to be
habitually resident in the State - a. where it has its statutory seat, b. under whose law it was incorporated or
formed, c. where it has its central administration, or d. where it has its principal place of business. Id. at 1075.
146. Article 4 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal covers Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court. Id. at
1075-76.
147. New Hague Convention, supra note 103, art. 5.
148. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85.
149. Article 6 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal deals with Infringement Actions. Id. at 1077.
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With respect to claims for enforcement of agreements pertaining to intellectual property rights, they can be brought "in any country whose rights are covered by the agreement." 5 0 If more than one country's rights are covered by the agreement, the action can
be brought "in the forum with the most significant relationship to the contract."' 51 What
exactly the term "most significant relationship" means is unclear, and creates great uncertainty, which again inefficiently increases the transaction costs.
According to the remedies section of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal, monetary and
injunctive relief (including permanent and preliminary injunctions) rendered by a competent court (that has jurisdiction over the case) must be recognized by the addressed courts
of a Member State. 15 2 But, there are a few exceptions to this rule. On the other hand, the
addressed court is entitled to refrain from enforcing an injunction in cases of health and
safety hazards or if fundamental cultural policies are at stake but only if a damages remedy
would be an effective alternative. 1s 3 In addition, courts other than the one where the suit
is pending are also entitled to render a preliminary injunction, which is limited to the
relevant court's territory. 15 4 Punitive and exemplary damages are recognized only if the
addressed court also recognizes them, while compensatory awards must always be
enforced. 55
One of the most important issues addressed in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal is the
consolidation issue.' 5 6 The proposal argues that consolidation of disputes involving intellectual property rights can contribute to the development of sound intellectual property
law and avoid confusion and misunderstandings. 5 7 The idea that lies at the base of this
notion is that greater consolidation has benefits for both sides because it "preserves litigation resources and reduces opportunities for harassment."'' 5 8 Undoubtedly, Professors
Ginsburg and Dreyfuss are correct in arguing that consolidation is extremely important in
the modern world and that it will benefit all the parties involved, as it will save expenses
and time and will assist in reaching consistent results. But, one may argue that extending
the bases for jurisdiction in such a way will result in uncertainties and forum shopping.
Arguably, an approach that would give exclusive jurisdiction to the country that granted
the right, or where the right is registered, would be a better solution to the problem
150. Article 7 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal addresses agreements pertaining to intellectual property
rights. Id. at 1078.
151. Id. at 1135.
152. Article 30 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal pertains to damages while Article 31 pertains to injunctive relief. Id. at 1087-88.
153. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 1088.
154. Id. at 1071-72.
155. Id. Punitive damages may be less of a problem than what many people think when it comes to intellectual property rights. The idea behind punitive damages is, to a great extent, "that imposing a detriment on
defendants promotes efficiency by deterring loss-creating conduct." Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1982). One may argue that since intellectual
property rights are private rights, there is no significant public policy to deter abuse and therefore compensatory damages may be sufficient. In other words, a convention limited to intellectual property judgments can
simply avoid requiring courts to recognize and enforce foreign punitive damages judgments in intellectual
property cases, without this creating a major obstacle.
156. Ginsburg and Dreyfuss view the issue of consolidation as a very important element of international
litigation. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, An Alert to the IntellectualProperty Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421, 424 (2001); Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note85, at 1066.
157. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 1070-71.
158. Id. at 1119.
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because these courts are better equipped to cope with the difficulties of interpreting the
relevant laws.
Furthermore, the idea of consolidation is based on the cooperation of the parties. Many
times, however, as indicated above, this is exactly the thing that some of the parties, usually the defendants, would like to avoid at any cost.
Providing a broad list of bases for jurisdiction may potentially lead to difficult results.
For example, we may find ourselves in a situation where two parties in a dispute file parallel complaints with respect to the same set of facts, in two different jurisdictions. Both
courts can legitimately decide the case under the proposed convention while declining to
waive jurisdiction based on the lis pendens doctrine. The result is two contradicting judgments rendered in two different countries that legitimately asserted jurisdiction over the
dispute. What would a court in a third country now do when faced with these two judgments and asked to enforce them?

1H. The Reasons for the Failure of Past Attempts to Regulate the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Problem
In light of the above analysis, one must wonder why, despite the extensive investment of
various international organizations and countries, so far there is no international agreement, convention, or instrument in effect that generally regulates international recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or specifically regulates intellectual property
judgments, and why there are regional instruments that have managed to resolve the associated problems and are successfully operating.
A closer look at the previous attempts discussed above, leads to the conclusion that the
common ground for all these instruments is the fact that they, to a certain extent, tried to
mix the issues of recognition and enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction. All of these
attempts were based on the notion of automatic enforcement of foreign judgments by the
court addressed, subject to very limited exceptions, if the rendering court had legitimate
jurisdiction based on a list of pre-approved bases of jurisdiction provided for in the same
international instrument. Even the recent attempt in the 2001 Hague Draft to create a
mixed convention instrument failed, as many believe, due to the use of the Brussels Convention as a model. 59 These proposals all required the potential members to agree on
bases for the assertion of jurisdiction.
Theoretically, this fact should not necessarily create a problem if the Member Countries can actually agree among themselves on the jurisdiction question. But, the question
has to be asked as to why the various countries in their efforts to create such an international instrument fail to reach an understanding as to the required bases of jurisdiction.
The most significant explanation is that the potential participating countries have different political, economic, and cultural objectives that pull them in different directions and
160
prevent them from reaching a common ground.
159. See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on InternationalYurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign
Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 191, 196-197

(2001).
160. See id. at 200.
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There are significant differences in interests among various countries with respect to
161
This reality is not a new one and was
the protection of intellectual property rights.
the
negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement,
During
ago.
recognized and addressed long
disagreements arose between different groups of countries that shared contradicting interests and views regarding the protection of intellectual property rights. Developed countries such as the United States, Japan, and members of the EU obviously supported a more
protectionist approach, as they are the main producers of intellectual property rights, especially with respect to patents. Their greatest fear was the possibility that many of the
inventions protected in their territories, which involve significant monetary and technological investments, would be copied, duplicated, and sold in other countries where less
emphasis is put on protection measures, thus resulting in significant monetary losses. On
the other side stood the developing countries that do engage in the development of technology but would benefit from weaker levels of intellectual property protection.
The TRIPS Agreement provides several arrangements to satisfy the needs of the developing and least-developed countries while still attempting to protect the rights and interests of the developed countries. For example, the least developed countries were granted a
grace period of ten years to be able to adjust their legal systems and laws to the require162
Similarly, Articles
ments of minimum standards set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.
65(2) and 65(4) allow developing countries a grace period, under certain conditions, of
four and five years, respectively. Another solution under TRIPS was the option governments were awarded to grant compulsory licenses to use and manufacture foreign patents
163
in certain and unique situations.
The same problem of contradicting interests in the protection of intellectual property
rights arises with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The
reason is simple. Courts are reluctant to recognize or enforce foreign judgments if they
contradict the enforcing country's interests. They can always try to find a way or a reason
to justify non-enforcement. One may argue that by doing so, these countries risk the
possibility that there will not be reciprocity, that is, that their own judgments will not be
recognized or enforced in foreign countries, which appears to be a value not worth risking. There is one major problem with this assumption, which is related to the differencesof-interest problem mentioned above, and causes this whole argument to collapse. Those
countries that may refuse to recognize or enforce foreign judgments are usually the same
countries that have less advanced intellectual property capabilities and provide lower levels
of protection (i.e., developing countries). To simplify the argument, this means that these
countries are not afraid that foreign courts, as a penalty or retaliation, may not enforce the
judgments that their courts render to protect local technologies because they do not always have such technologies to protect. From an economic perspective, the gain that they
may realize as a result of not enforcing foreign judgments protecting advanced foreign
technologies far outweighs the loss that they may suffer if their judgments are not enforced abroad in retaliation for their refusal to enforce foreign judgments.
161. Franklin & Morris, supra 86, at 1244.
162. See Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. This broad exception does not include compliance with Articles
3 and 4, which address the issues of National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment. Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, art. 66,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 108.
163. Id. art. 31.
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The pattern of the TRIPS negotiations is repeated here. The fact that different countries have contradicting interests and each of them has its own private agenda leads to the
inevitable conclusion that it will be very difficult to reach a common ground of understanding that would make it possible for different countries to agree on an instrument that
would govern recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Some countries are simply
more eager to have their judgments recognized and enforced abroad than others. From a
practical perspective, it seems that if a country is determined to allow intellectual property
infringement within its borders because it serves its interests, no one and nothing will be
able to restrain it from doing so. The conclusion, therefore, is that in order to be able to
create such an instrument, a way needs to be found to overcome these differences in interests, a process that has already started in the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement.
The only international instrument that did not try to mix the issue of enforcement with
the issue of jurisdiction was the previously discussed 1971 Hague Convention, which was
also the only one to ever reach the advanced stage of ratification. Even though this instrument ultimately failed, we can be encouraged by its relative success mainly because there
were other reasons that can explain this failure, such as its complex structure that required
Member Countries to negotiate bilateral instruments in addition to their signing of the
convention, as more thoroughly discussed above. To a certain extent, the differences-ofinterest problem may ironically be the very reason for the relative success of the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions, which relate to participants who, at least in recent years, pursue
a similar agenda and interests.
Despite the extensive negotiations that took place in previous years to reach a common
agreement regarding bases of jurisdiction for issues involving intellectual property rights,
no such understanding has ever been reached, and it is doubtful that it may be reached in
the near future. The interests and the gaps involved are simply too wide. As one U.S.
government official has put it, "[t]he group is finding it difficult to draft rules even in a
limited number of areas," 164 not to mention a more comprehensive instrument. Therefore, it is probably best to look in another direction for a solution.
If there is one lesson that we can learn from this historical analysis of past attempts to
create an international convention, it is that any use of the mixed or double convention
model is doomed to fail in light of the inability of the potential members to agree on the
jurisdiction question due to substantial cultural, historical, and economic gaps. In order to
avoid the jurisdiction problem, a different model should be used and another solution
must be explored.

164. William New, E-Commerce: International Negotiators Divided On Online Contract Disputes, NAT'L J,
TECH. DAILY (March 10, 2003), available at http://ists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-commercial-law/
2003-March/000774.html.
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